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ABSTRACT 
Structural changes in TV markets are resulting in carriage disputes that have spread from the United 
States to Europe. A carriage dispute refers to a disagreement between a pay-TV operator and a 
broadcaster over the right to ‘carry’ a broadcaster’s channel. TV broadcasters are demanding ever 
increasing payments from pay-TV operators that complain about lower-profit margins due to 
spiralling programming costs. This article discusses vertical mergers between distributors and 
broadcasters as a possible way to reduce retransmission payments and to secure cheap and 
privileged access to programming in today’s hypercompetitive video markets. 
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GROWING NUMBER OF RETRANSMISSION BATTLES 
Carriage disputes between pay-TV operators and TV broadcasters have become increasingly public in 
recent years. A carriage dispute refers to a disagreement over the right to ‘carry’, or retransmit, a 
broadcaster’s channel. Some of these disputes have taken the form of epic battles, dominating policy 
forums and heating up public debate for months. In August 2013, for example, Time Warner Cable 
(TWC) dropped major network CBS in eight large US markets after TWC and CBS failed to agree on a 
new retransmission contract – accusing each other of grandstanding and punitive conduct. 
Additionally, TWC demanded CBS’ exclusive rights so as to prevent over-the-top (OTT) competitors 
from obtaining the live rights to CBS programmes. Although industry watchers expected that this 
fight would cost CBS some $400,000 a day, TWC’s third-quarter earnings (Q3, 2013) revealed that the 
cable operator had lost no less than 306,000 subscribers following the month-long CBS blackout (CBS 
also blocked TWC broadband subscribers from watching programmes online on CBS.com). Against all 
odds, CBS was able to negotiate a substantial increase in retransmission fees (from about 50 cent to 
around $2 per subscriber per month) and to maintain its digital rights that it could sell to Netflix, 
Amazon and others (Stock 2013). 
Although the mechanisms of retransmission payments are strongly rooted in historical and 
structural patterns of the US media system, market-driven compensations, on top of existing 
copyright provisions, are also making inroads into European TV markets. Some pay-TV operators, 
 
mainly cable operators, have been paying TV broadcasters retransmission fees for decades, but since 
the mid-2000s European TV broadcasters have put retransmission fees back on the industry and 
policy agenda. Free-to-air broadcasters in the United Kingdom, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands 
and other countries started seeking after (higher) retransmission payments and complained about 
distributors’ unfair economic practices (Evens and Donders 2013). In the United Kingdom, for 
example, terrestrial broadcasters BBC, ITV, Channel Four and Channel Five stated they were paying 
leading pay-TV platform BSkyB £24.4 million per year to have access to the satellite platform. 
Following public controversy about the high access charges, in February 2014, the BBC, ITV and 
BSkyB reached an agreement that reduces the BBC and ITV’s payments for platform services to zero. 
Instead of charging free-to-air broadcasters, Mediatique (2012) calculated BSkyB should pay the 
channels retransmission fees between £190 and 220 million. Hence, ITV announced its intention to 
push for BSkyB to pay US-style retransmission fees to carry the commercial channel, which could 
provide an additional income source. ITV argues that its investment in programming – about £1 
billion per year – is justification for the payment of retransmission fees by BSkyB and Virgin. 
 
HIGHER PROGRAMMING COSTS, LOWER PROFIT MARGINS 
Having more alternatives for distribution, broadcasters can now play pay-TV operators off against 
each other and bargain more favourable deals than in previously monopolistic markets. Structural 
market changes due to digital TV distribution and competitive entry in distribution have allowed 
broadcasters to demand higher retransmission fees, resulting in an increasing number of negotiating 
impasses between pay-TV operators and broadcasters (O’Reilly 2008). Moreover, the high 
dependence on advertising income and the competitive pressure on these revenues following 
commercial skipping and on-demand viewing urge TV broadcasters to diversify their revenue base. 
Indeed, changing economic conditions call for alternative and possibly more stable income sources. 
Whereas advertising investments tightly correspondent to economic conjuncture, subscriptions for 
premium cable and satellite services have proved quite persistent during economic downturns 
(Picard 2011). Even more, consumer expenses have been on the rise for years. The development of 
digital TV was accompanied with a shift towards subscription services, changing the function of free-
to-air broadcasters into showrooms for premium channels and on-demand platforms. Therefore, it is 
no surprise that TV broadcasters started bargaining for higher retransmission payments from pay-TV 
operators, and want to benefit from the spectacular growth of pay-TV, following the completion of 
digital switchover, in most parts of the world (Evens 2013). 
Basically, it all boils down to the question of who actually benefits from whose investments. 
Discussions between free-to-air broadcasters and distributors are captured by the tension between 
maximizing own revenues while not jeopardizing a long-lasting contractual relation. Broadcasters 
argue that relations with distributors are (no longer) economically ‘fair’ (Donders and Evens 2014). 
Although free-to-air broadcasters in Denmark, the Netherlands and Belgium receive substantial 
retransmission payments, they contend that this fee is too low in comparison with the popularity of 
their programming which is driving pay-TV adoption. Broadcasters claim that they carry the bulk of 
investments in quality content, whereas distributors take a disproportional share of the pie, without 
significantly contributing to the financing and production of that content. Waterman and Han (2010) 
provide an empirical basis for such claims, demonstrating that pay-TV operators have been able to 
 
take far greater economic advantage of the digital switchover than broadcasters. According to Ofcom 
(2012), in 2010, UK public service broadcasters spent 27% of their revenues on domestic first-run 
productions (£1.868 billion) compared to only 2% spent by pay-TV operators (£215 million). 
However, profits are unevenly shared among the TV industry. Ernst & Young (2013) found that cable 
operators, partly fuelled by high-margin bundling strategies, overall have cash flow (EBITDA) profit 
margins of 41%, outperforming satellite operators (25%) and TV broadcasters (19%). 
However, network operators argue that these margins are becoming under severe pressure due 
to spiralling programming and network costs. The popularity of online video and the subsequent 
increase in data traffic is placing an extra burden on the network’s performance (Netflix, e.g., 
accounts for about a third of total broadband usage in the United States), urging additional 
investments in network optimization (without significant return). Moreover, pay-TV operators report 
an enduring pressure on video margins from continued high programming cost growth. According to 
SNL Kagan (2013) retransmission fees in the United States grew from $215 million to $762 million 
between 2006 and 2009, and they are projected to exceed $6 billion in 2018. Pay-TV operators’ 
programming expenses (as a proportion of total revenues) have risen from 33.3 per cent to 39.7 per 
cent between 2004 and 2013, and are likely to further erode pay-TV operators’ margins. Finally, the 
saturation of digital TV penetration in most Western European countries is slowing down revenue 
growth. Due to intense platform competition in the pay-TV market, there is a continuous pressure to 
offer enticing programming bundles and price promotions. As the long-term sustainability of the 
current pay-TV business model is questioned, the industry is looking for new growth strategies. 
 
TRENDING: HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL MERGERS 
Pay-TV markets, both in Europe and in the United States, have seen an acceleration of merger and 
acquisition activity since 2013. The New Wave of mergers and acquisitions is characterized by far-
going consolidation in distribution markets and concentration among content providers and 
distributors. Vodafone’s acquisition of Ono and Kabel Deutschland in Spain and Germany, as well as 
Liberty Global’s acquisition of cable infrastructure in the United Kingdom (Virgin) and the 
Netherlands (Ziggo) are exemplary for further horizontal concentration. In the United States, cable 
operators Comcast and TWC are expected to merge, as well as IPTV operator AT&T and satellite 
provider DirecTV. Liberty Global’s interest in vertical integration has become apparent through its 
purchase of shares (all in 2014) in production company all3media, free-to-air broadcaster ITV and De 
Vijver Media, a Belgian production and free-to-air television company. Liberty Global, which earns 
over 90 per cent of its revenues in the twelve European markets it is active in (Austria, Belgium, 
Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Switzerland 
and the United Kingdom), has been unequivocal about its strategy of vertical integration with OTT, 
television production and free-to-air television. In an interview with the Wall Street Journal, CEO 
Mike Fries said such a strategy is a means to overcome competition from players such as Netflix and 
to avoid transmission fees for broadcasters reaching US levels (Schechner and Zekaria 2014). 
It is expected that the horizontal and vertical strategy undertaken by Liberty Global will act as 
blueprint for further industry consolidation in distribution and content markets. In effect, 
consolidation lies at the heart of the future pay-TV business model. Horizontal partnerships give the 
 
merging parties more scale and leverage in programming negotiations; larger pay-TV operators are 
typically able to negotiate lower retransmission fees per subscriber than smaller firms (Adilov and 
Alexander 2006). The purchase of a free-to-air broadcaster allows cable operators to sit on both sides 
during carriage negotiations, and indirectly control the spiralling retransmission fees that 
broadcasters receive. Research shows that, apart from possible market foreclosure and 
discriminatory conduct, vertical integration leads to operational efficiency in bilateral contracting and 
reduces transaction costs (Waterman and Choi 2011). Paying lower retransmission fees to affiliated 
broadcasters will automatically temper fees paid to competing broadcast networks, and bring 
retransmission payments, especially in the United States, back to normal levels. This is not a 
counterproductive development per se since US broadcasters have gained a competitive advantage 
vis-à-vis pay-TV operators, but this evolution is not welcomed in Europe, where monopolistic cable 
operators still control most national markets. In such a market structure, there is a concern that 
lower retransmission payments will ultimately result in lower investments in original content 
commissioning and thus negatively affect the development of a robust, innovative European content 
ecosystem. 
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